# Court Condemns Him on Nearly Every Count.

# DISOBEYED ORDERS.

"Vacillating, Dilatory and Lacked Enterprise."

# MILDLY DISSENTS.

Court Says Schley Did Not Proceed With All Despatch to Santiago.

NOR TO CIENFUEGOS EITHER.

Made No Effort to Ascertain Presence of Spanish Fleet.

The Opinion of the Court Is That Schley Have Proceeded With All Despatch to Clenfueges and Santiage -Should Not Have Delayed the Squadren for the Eagle-Should Not Have Made Retrograde Movement-Should Have Promptly Obeyed Department's Orders-Should Have Endeavored to Capture Spanish Vessels at Ancher Near Entrance to Santiago Harbor -Did Not Do His Utmost to Capture or Destroy the Colon on May 81 and Position With Spanish Vessels in Making the Turn and Caused the Texas to Back Her Kogines to Aveid Colliid Injustice to Hodgson in Pub-Only Part of Correspondence Was Inaccurate and Misleading in Reports on Coal Supply and Coaling Fa-

cilities -His Conduct in Battle Praised

Washington, Dec. 13.—Rear Admiral tion by his brothers in arms has resulted in general condemnation of his conduct in the Santiago campaign by the Court of Inquiry, composed of Admiral George Dewey and Rear Admirals A. E. K. Benham and F. M. Ramsay. In their findings and opinion, submitted to the Secretary of the Navy to-day, these three high ranking officers unanimously hold that Admiral Schley's conduct off the south coast of Cuba prior to June 1, when Admiral Sampson arrived at Santiago, was "characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness and lack of enterprise." The court is a unit in reporting adversely to Admiral Schley on his delay at Cienfuegos, the character of the Cienfuegos blockade, his disobedience of the Navy Department's orders to remain at Santiago, his claims that he had only enough coal to reach Key West and that he could not coal at sea or go to Cape Cruz or Gonaives Channel to take fuel, and the retrograde movement from Santiago toward Key West. Admiral Schley's statement under oath that positive information was given him by the "scouts" that Cervera's fleet was not at Santiago is not accepted by the court.

Unanimously the officers who conducted the inquiry find against Admiral Schley for his failure to destroy the Colon and for the loop managuvre, which they maintain was made to keep the Brooklyn from getting too close to the Spanish ships. They old also that this manusers at a critical period in the battle endangered the Texas, eausing her to stop and back her engines. The alleged colloquy or conversation the battle of July 8, between Admiral Beliley and Lieutenant Commander Hodgson, the brooklyn's navigator, is found to have taken place, thus disproving Admiral Service's statement to the l'nited States Security that the Brooklysi's torn was much is prevent that ship from blanketing time has of the other American chips. In reporting that the loop was made to keep the Brooklys: from getting 4000 sintigerous stores to distolish in the other explanations for delanical division of this assert observant

The court holds that fiching slid an insection to Lantitemant-Communicates Modgana o gratisting his inter, denying funt the milingua of duly & some accounted, whitepretriculating Montgacer's accompanying bet ter explaining that the straight applied unit An the literal privatury of the nothings; as printed in East Hele and and to its substanor growing for which Hodgeon regulard The sour matter to making that in the battle of July 2. Helping was self-presented and terminated the officers and men to fight coragnosaly. He nely recommendation in this to view of the brought of time that have risposed steps the finalisago essipaign, so terfore proceedings are desired increasely An all the findings and applicant noted the court was unanimous, high it

firer to Florada?

separate statement, in which he noted his lisagreement with the adverse findings and opinions of his colleagues on the remaining points laid down in the precept and offered the gratuitous expression that he regarded Schley as Commander-in-Chief in the Santiago battle and as entitled to

the glory of the victory. This voluntary contribution of opinion on a subject that did not come within the province of the court is more inexplicable nd remarkable in view of the attitude of Admiral Dewey during the inquiry. It was he who was foremost among the members of the court in opposing the introduction of evidence tending to show that Admiral Schley and not Admiral Sampson was in supreme command of the squadron that attacked the Spanish ships on July 3, 1898. The attempt of W. H. Stayton, Admiral Sampson's attorney, to be recognized by the court when Schlev's counsel maintained that Schley and not Sampson was the victor of that great naval engagement, was repulsed personally by Admiral Dewey without consultations with Admirals Benham and Ramsay. Afterward they sustained his position that the question of who commanded the United States naval force in the battle of July 3 should not be introduced into the proceedings. Why Admiral Dewey, in violation of his stand at that time and particularly in view of his refusal to permit evidence supporting Admiral Sampson's claim to be introduced, should now give Schley credit for the Santiago victory is regarded as remarkable

and unprecedented. The Court's report is signed, as the regulations direct, only by its President, Admiral Dewey, and its Judge Advocate, Capt. Lemley, who merely attests. By virtue of the rule of the majority, Admiral Dewey was obliged to append his name to all the findings, even those with which he did not agree. On all the important questions considered by the court, he agrees with his colleagues, disagreeing only with regard to the Cienfuegos blockade and making some explanatory state-ment concerning Schley's failure

to obtain information at Cienfuegos and the passage of the Flying Squadron from Key West to Cienfuegos and thence to Santiago. Curiously enough, the remaining point in his separate statement is an agreement with the inference o be drawn from the conclusions of his colleagues that Schley's Santiago blockade was effective. That is the only specification laid down in the precept on which Schlev is cleared.

The Court's findings and opinions are expressed in crisp, clear sentences that eave no doubt as to their meaning. They follow in full:

#### THE COURT'S FINDINGS. COURT OF INQUIRY, MCLEAN BUILLING, Y

1517 H STREET, N. W., WASHINGTON, D. C., Dec. 13, 1901. The Court having, by the authority of the Navy Department, occupied rooms Nos. 9 and 10, McLean Building, No. 1517 H street, N. W., Washington, D. C., while deliberating upon its proceedings, and the mbers thereof having assembled daily since Monday, Nov. 11, with the exception of Sundays and holidays, and having concluded the investigation, reports its proceedings and the testimony taken, with a full and detailed statement of all the pertinent facts which it deems to be established. together with its opinion and recommenda-

#### tion in the premises FACTS.

The Flying Squadron, consisting of the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas and Scorion, under the command of Commodore W. S. Schley, U. S. N., sailed from Key West about 8 A. M. of May 19, 1898, with orders from the Navy Department and from the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic Squadron to proceed with despatch (utmost) off (Senfuegos to capture the enemy off that port, if possible, or to blockade him, and to maintain the blockade as

close as possible. The Flying Squadron arrived off Cienuegos on the morning of May 22, and established a blockade. During the day the ships lay off the port at various distances, in no particular order. At night they formed in column of vessels, headed off shore and moved at only sufficient speed for keeping positions. The small vessels performed picket duty in shore of the large

Commodore Schley did not proceed with utmost despatch off Cienfuegos and blockade

that port as close as possible. At 10 A. M., May 22, the Dupont arrived at Clenfuegos with a despatch from the Commander-in-Chief, dated Key West, May 20, 1898, which informed Commodore Schley of the probability of the Spanish aquadron being in Santiago de Cuba, and ordered him to hold Cienfueges until the receipt of more positive information. At 10:30 P. M., May 22, the lows arrived

at Clenfuegos, and at 7 P M of the same date the Scorpion left Cienfuegos for Santiago.

ORDERED TO PROCEED TO SANTIAGO. At 8:15 A. M. of May 23. Commodore chiey received by the despatch vessel Hawk, the following despatch and memorandom from the Commander-in-Chief Despatch No 8, dated Key West, May 21, inus, which stated that the Spanish aquadron was probably at hantingo and ordered Commodore fichiey, if he was natisfied that the Spanish aquadren was not at themfuegos, to "proceed with all despatch, but eguidousir, to fightings de tube, and if the enemy is there blockade him in that

21. 1898, which directed Commodory Schley to mak his movements in leaving tion-

A memorandum which stated that a production, that the tubes forces to the han done mountains contribut the rations interest finishingue and Trinital and that there were fair roads from the landing place to finalizings.

At some A M. May 22 that I patient soul or collier Morrissan arraced at Canadiagnor At some tot the same time the British, meaner Adula was permitted to go and

All T A M. Max VX the Machetratt Water and Engle arrived at therefore a Alest to A M the Marticitant and Engle proceeded to the latting place, 181; miles west of feargrolle Point, communicated with the insurgenite, insulini etorop for them. honesand that the Bymmish squashron was not an the harkes of Campburgue, reprinted the regulation at 8 to 9' ld and requested to Even appeliate Schies the information obsgried. After the receipt of this information

Through a Closele Watting Streets of Marbie You pass to exite the great through teams of the New York (epitus at Grand Crutes) Stating, is the ceptre of the city of New York - Add.

the Commander-in-Chief in which he stated: "I shall move eastward to-morrow." He also wrote a despatch to the commandant of the naval base at Key West in which he stated: "As it is not found practicable to coal the Texas from the collier here, where there is so much swell, I shall proceed tomorrow off Santiago de Cuba, being embarrassed, however, by the Texas' short coal supply and her inability to coal in the open sea. I shall not be able to remain off that port on account of general short coal supply of squadron, so will proceed to the vicinity of Nicolas Mole where the water is smooth and I can coal Texas and other ships with what may remain in collier.

No work was, apparently, in progress on the fortifications of Cienfuegos Commodore Schley was off that port.

No efforts were made by Commodo Schley to communicate with the insurgents, to discover whether the Spanish squadron was in the harbor of Cienfuegos prior to the morning of May 24.

Signal lights were displayed on shore at night, May 22 and May 23, but Commodore Schley had no information which enabled him to interpret them.

Before sailing from Cienfuegos, Commodore Schley received reliable information that ships could be coaled in the vicinity of Cape Cruz and in Gonaives Channel.

THE START FOR SANTIAGO. The Flying Squadron, with the exception of the Castine, sailed from Cienfuegos about 8 P. M. of May 24; the heavy ships in column of vessels, the light ships on the right flank and the collier Merrimac on the left flank. At 10:10 A. M. of May 26, the light vessels were shifted to the port beam and the collier to the starboard beam.

Before midnight of May 24, owing to heavy rolling, the forward compartment of the Eagle filled with water, which reduced her speed.

On May 25 the wind was fresh from the eastward, the weather was bad and the sea was heavy for small vessels. The squadron reduced its speed to enable the Eagle to remain with it. On May 26 the weather improved, the wind veered to the westward and became light, and the sea moderated. At 1:30 A. M. Commodore Schley sent the Eagle to Port Antonio to call and then to return to Key West. On noon of May 26 the Eagle had sufficient coal to steam ten knots per hour for three days. At 5:30 P. M. the squadron stopped about twenty-two miles to the southward of the port of Santiago and was joined by the scouts Minneapolis, Yale and St. Paul. At 6 P. M., May 26, the engines of the collier Merrimac were temporarily disabled. The engines were changed to work "compound," and at 4:20 P. M. of May 27 she was able to make six knots with her own steam. The broken parts of the engines were repaired on board the flagship, all repairs being completed at midnight of May 28. The

Yale towed the Merrimac while disabled. The commanding officer of the St. Paul visited the flagship, in obedience to signal, took with him a Cuban pilot and had a conversation with Commodore Schley. Commodore Schley had no conversation with the senior commanding officer of the scouts and obtained no positive information from the scouts regarding the Spanish squadron.

THE RETBOGRADE MOVEMENT. At 7:45 P. M., May 26, Commodore Schley changed the course of the Flying Squadron to the westward and signalled to his squadron: "Destination Key West, via south

soon as collier is ready; speed, nine knots." westward eighteen miles; stopped at 11:15 P. M., the towlines of the collier having parted; drifted until 3:40 P. M., May 27; resumed its westward course for twenty-three miles; stopped again at 7:15 P. M. and drifted until 1 P. M. of May 28.

At 9:30 A. M., May 27, the Harvard joined the Flying Squadron and her commanding officer delivered to Commodore Schley the following despatch, dated May 25, addressed by the Department to the Harvard at St. Nicholas Mole, Hayti:

\*Proceed at once and inform Schlev and also the senior officer present off Santiago de Cuba as follows: 'All Department's information indicates the Spanish division is still at Santiago de Cuba. Department looks to you to ascertain fact and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action. Cubans familiar with Santiago de Cuba say that there is landing place five nautical miles west, or six from mouth of harbor, and that there insurgents probably will be found and not Spanish. From the surrounding heights can see every vessel in the port. As soon as ascertained notify Department whether enemy is there. Could not equadron and also the Harvard coal from Merrimae leeward Cape Cruz. Cuba. Gonaives, Hayti Channel, or Mole, Hayti Department will send immediately to Mole. Hayti Report without delay

situation at Santiago de Cuba " THE CANNOT-OBET-ORDER DESPATCH This deepatch was answered by Commodore Schley about noon, May 27, as fol-

Received despatch of May 26th, delivered by Harvard off Santiago de Cuba. Merrimac engine is disabled and she is helpiess am obliged to have her towed o Key West Have teen alsolutely unable to cont the Texas, Marbichend, Vixer and Brooklyn from collier, owing to very rough seas and housterous weather since leaving Key West Brookirn is the Sonly one in equation having more than sufficient and to reach Key Wood Impossible to remain off handage in present state of sitis to real to personal of Cape Crus to attenue owing to southwest winds good inneling place had been found by Hervard just reported to me she has sonly Communicated Metalic 181; notice went of coal anotage to reach damates and che will Environtille Patiet, that the Calusto hard per- proceed for Pari Boyel plea require noily fact according of what was going on within small consess could came at Conserve or feet according to what was going on within small consess could came at Conserve or Conference that the tubus forces in the Mode Hayri Missempolis has only comconsigli to reach Key West this same Yair, which will how Merrinar & in tor regretted that the Department's orders cannot be exerced, respectly as we have all atrives to that end I per forced to reture to Key West via Vicentan passange for road. Can ascretain nothing certain con-First Antonio, Annuaica, restorday no shhad only toward outton tone of road or toward Will impro 8t Pari tore Will tospaint \$1,000 tesss of road at Key West CHAI MOPPLY MUPPLEMENT

The coul supply of the smooth of the Firing Reputation at them or May 7: car sufficient to have englished them to steam tojoints per bour. The Branklyn for 175 days, the lowe for 15, steps, the Manus-chasette for 10 days, the Tenne 65, there, Markiehead for Big days, the

Commodore Schley wrote a despatch to for 11% days; or to have remained on block- in a daily newspaper a letter addressed to ade duty off Santiago de Cuba: The Brooklyn for 26 days, the Iowa for 16 days, the Massachusetts for 20 days, the Texas for 10 days, the Marblehead for 5 days, the Vixen for 23 days, and then steam to Gonaives, Hayti, or to Cape Cruz, Cuba, to coal. At that date the Flying Squadron was accompanied by the collier Merrimac, containing 4,350 tons of coal. The amount of coal required to completely fill the coal bunkers of all the vessels of the Flying Squadron on this same date was 2,750 tons. CONDITIONS PAVORABLE FOR COALING.

The conditions of wind, sea and weather from noon on May 26 to June 1 were favorable for taking coal from a collier at sea off Santiago. The Iowa, Castine and Dupont coaled at Cienfuegos from the collier Merrimac on May 23, and the Massachusett; and Castine on May 24. The Texas asked permission to coal first on May 23, and was refused by Commodore Schley, who ordered the Iowa to coal first and the Massachusetts second. The Texas was ordered to coal from the collier on May 24, but the order was revoked, as the Massachusetts was alongside of the collier and the commanding officer of the collier deemed it unsafe to place his vessel between two battleships. The Texas and Marblehead couled at sea off Santiago, from colliers, May 27 and 28; the Massachusetts and Vixen on May 29; the Brooklyn and Iowa on May 30; the Brooklyn, Texas and Marblehead on May 31. At 3:35 P. M., May 27, Commodore Schley signalled to the St. Paul: "If Sampson comes here tell him half of squadron out

of coal and collier engine broken down." At 10:45 P. M., May 27, Commodore Schley signalled to the Texas: "The more coal you take in this smooth weather the less you will have to take in Hayti."

MADE NO EFFORT AT SANTIAGO TO FINE

SPANISH SQUADRON. Commodore Schley made no effort to ascertain whether the Spanish squadron was in the harbor of Santiago; he left said harbor entirely unguarded from 6 P. M of May 26 to 5 P. M. of May 27, and guarded only by the scout St. Paul from 5 P. M. May 27 until about 6 P. M. May 28. The Flying Squadron arrived off the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, seven miles south of the Morro, at 6 P. M. May 28, and estab

The distance from Cienfuegos to Santiago is 315 miles. Commodore Schley did not proceed with all despatch from Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba.

THE ATTACK ON THE COLON. Early on the morning of May 29 the Cris-

tobal Colon and other vessels of the Spanish squadron were discovered at anchor in the harbor of Santiago, about 1,200 yards from the entrance. No attempt was made by Commodore Schley on May 29 or May 30 to capture or destroy these Spanish vesels. At 1:30 P. M., May 30, the cruiser New Orleans and the collier Sterling joined the Flying Squadron.

At 10:55 A. M., May 31, Commodore Schley shifted his flag to the Massachusetts. At 11:10 A. M. the flagship Massa chusetts signalied: "The Massachusetts, New Orleans and Iowa will go after dinner to a distance of 7,000 yards and fire at Cristobal Colon with 8 and 12-inch guns. Speed about ten knots."

At 1:30 P. M. the three vessels designated steamed in column toward the entrance to the harbor of Santiago, heading to the eastward, at about ten knots' speed. The side of Cuba and Yucatan Channel, as ships passed the harbor entrance about 7,000 yards distant from the Morro, firing at the Colon and the shore batteries with ranges varying from 7,000 yards to 8,200

yards. All projectiles fell short. When the ships had passed to the east ward of the entrance the flagship turned off shore, followed in succession by the other ships, repassed the entrance and fired as before but with ranges varying from 9,000 yards to 11,000 yards. Some of these projectiles fell near the Colon. fire was returned by the ships in the harbon and by the land batteries, but no large guns were used by the batteries. Several projectiles passed over our vessels, but no njuries were sustained.

# THE SANTIAGO BLOCKADE

The Flying Squadron did not withdraw at night from the entrance to Santiago harbor to a distance at sea. The blockade was maintained at an average distance of about six to seven miles from the harbor entrance during the day and probably somewhat nearer during the night. Two vessels performed picket duty at night, two miles inside of the line of vessels.

The Spanish squadron was discovered to be in the entrance to Santiago harbor steaming out at about 9 30 A M . July 3, 1898. The Brooklyn at that time was heading to the westward of north, about 6,300 yards southwest, three-quarters south from the ing position

Large vessels coming out of the harbon of Bantiago were obliged to head about mouthwest by south and the Spanish vessels therefore, in coming out, until clear of the shoul to the westward, were obliged to head directly for the position of the Brook iyn When clear of this shoul the lipuntal vessels turned, in succession, to the west ward and took a contac hearly parallel to

#### the land THE PROOBLEYS'S LOOP.

The Brooklyn stood toward the Spanish crassic with carring below fired our shot from her forward turnet at \$500 yards sange, which proved short, and then on gaged with her port battery. Later yearsin distant from the leasting repaired ship, the Terena, the Brooklyn turned plasticard, with her links hard again, an continued so to turn said sie kengood the westward parallel to the mourse of the Bymoseb slope. Flor communities office much at gianout the major leadand toasse Bobber gave the order. Mara appart When the Brooklyn's latin was per base

agent the kerner was about 1,800 parts : the eastward of mobile from the Mesophics the highest wan to the conteasy of Terms and the tolor may to the successful the Shounds Wilson the Brombies compacted the turn and was bearing mantaged, paraticl to the remove of Longon, the Visional and his folias was stone have pardy to the morthwest and meanment of the Boundary. The horse of the Brooking was toward the Team. The Trace stapped and backed for enginee.

On July 2, 1888, planed the time the Brook. lyn began her turn to starboard, a convariation regarding the prostunty of the Young took place between Commodors

Admiral Schley caused to be politicles Demer's Willes Are Pare

him by Lieutenant-Commander A. C. Hodgson, dated June 11, 1899, in which Lieutenant-Commander Hodgson said: colloquy published in THE NEW YORK SUN and alleged to have taken place between you and me on the day of the battle of Santiago, July 3, 1898, never occurred. Admiral Schley did not have published the other letters of Lieutenant-Commander Hodgson in regard to this matter

#### OPINION. Commodore Schley, in command of the Flying Squadron, should have proceeded with utmost despatch off Cienfuegos and should have maintained a close blockade

of that port. He should have endeavored on May 23, at Cienfuegos, to obtain information regarding the Spanish squadron by communicating with the insurgents at the place designated in the memorandum delivered to him at 8:15 A. M. of that date.

He should have proceeded from Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba with all despatch, and should have disposed his vessels with a view of intercepting the enemy in any attempt to pass the Flying Squadron.

He should not have delayed the squadron for the Eagle. He should not have made the retrograde

turn westward with his squadron. He should have promptly obeyed the

Navy Department's order of May 25. He should have endeavored to capture or destroy the Spanish vessels at anchor near the entrance of Santiago harbor on May 29 and 30.

He did not do his utmost with the force under his command to capture or destroy the Colon and other vessels of the enemy which he attacked on May 31. By commencing the engagement on July

3 with the port battery and turning the Brooklyn around with port helm, Commodore Schley caused her to lose distance and position with the Spanish vessels, especially with the Viscaya and Colon.

The turn of the Brooklyn to starboard was made to avoid getting her into dangerous proximity to the Spanish vessels. The turn was made toward the Texas and caused that vessel to stop and to back her engines to avoid possible collision. Admiral Schley did injustice to Lieuten-

ant-Commander A.C. Hodgson in publishing only a portion of the correspondence which passed between them. Commodore Schley's conduct in connec-

tion with the events of the Santiago campaign prior to June 1, 1898, was characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness and lack of enterprise. His official reports regarding the coal

supply and the coaling facilities of the Flying Squadron were inaccurate and misleading. His conduct during the battle of July 3

was self-possessed, and he encouraged, in his own person, his subordinates, officers and men, to fight courageously.

GEORGE DEWEY. Admiral, U. S. N., President. SAM C. LEMLY,

Judge Advocate General, U. S. N., Judge

ADMIRAL DEWEY'S OPINION In the opinion of the undersigned the passage from Key West to Cienfuegos was made by the Flying Squadron with all possible despatch, Commodore Schley having in view the importance of arriving off Cienfuegos with as much coal as possible in the ships' bunkers.

The blockade of Cienfuegos was effec-

Commodore Schley, in permitting the steamer Adula to enter the port of Cienfuegos, expected to obtain information concerning the Spanish squadron from her when she came out.

The passage from Cienfuegos to a point about twenty-two miles south of Santiago was made with as much despatch as was possible while keeping the squadron a

The blockade of Santiago was effective Commodore Schley was the senior officer of our equadron off Santiago when the Spanish equadron attempted to escape on the morning of July 3, 1898 He was in absolute command and is entitled to the credit due to such commanding officer for the glorious victory which resulted in the total destruction of the Spanish GEORGE DEWEY. Asimiral, U.S. N.

NAM C. LEMEY. Judge Advocate General, U. S. N., Judge Adventage

# RECOMMENDATION

In view of the length of time which has elapsed since the occurrence of the events of the Santiago compaign, the court recommende no further proceedings he had in the premiers Gronor Drwey. Admiral, I S. N. President

HAM C LEMEN. Judge Adversate General, I. S. N., Judge

ARCRETARY LONG GREE THE REPORT

The court constrained its consultations averal days ago and the report was their proposed To-day a final meeting was keld at which during Advante Lendy was present to read over the official copy of the record of findings, opinion and recommendation fits was then aspeed Admiral Rever and time Lemis, and with Assessmi kiercen e requesale adatestació mobaseded to tage family to be laken to the mountary of the Bank Sapri. Laurie banded the stommette to favorency forg aboutly define a reduck this afternoon Copies pose diade and these year given members of the present the Name the partnant to moreoury lying promisis at an exact to sight. The might's delibera-

sellicanic of the Budy Respectment are some final matadisti wash file contributions of the rough purchasianty as no all the major accorations against Admiral ficking the worst appetitioned to filest names. White an devicing has been reached by the facpartment as to what action will be taken the matter it is regarded as certain

nendation that there be no further proceeding against Admiral Schley will be

An official copy of the court's conclusions and the separate statement of Admiral Dewey were delivered to Admiral Schley to-night at the Richmond Hotel, where he resides. When seen there after he had read what the Court reported Admiral Schley

"I will not say a word about the verdict of the court. I do not intend to say any-

thing about it now or at any other time. The most important feature of the court's conclusions is the repudiation of many of Admiral Schley's statements in official despatches to the Navy Department and under oath before the officers conducting the inquiry into his conduct. Very little that he said in his despatch of May 27, 1898. to the Secretary of the Navy, excusing his departure from Santiago for Key West was accepted by the court as true. This is one of the official reports which the court unanimously characterized as "inaccurate

and misleading." The court shows in its findings that it did not believe these statements of Admiral Schley in that communication that the collier Merrimac was helpless, that he had been absolutely unable to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen and Brooklyn, owing to very rough seas and boisterous weather since the Flying Squadron left Key West; that the Brooklyn was the only ship in the squadron with more than sufficient coal to reach Key West; that it was impossible to remain off Santiago on account of lack of coal; that

it was not possible to coal at that he Cape Cruse; only small ships could coal at Gonaives, Hayti, and he was obliged to return to Key West for coal. The court found that instead of having only one ship with more than enough coal to return to Key West, all the vessels had plenty of coal, could have maintained the blockade for a considerable period, and could have taken coal from a collier at sea at any time after noon on May 26, when the squadron halted. twenty-two miles southeast of Santiago. The despatch saying he didn't have enough coal, couldn't take any from the collier, and had to go back to Key West, was sent by Schley on May 27, when the sea had been smooth for twenty-four hours. The court also indicates disbelief in Schlev's statement that he had intended to go to Santiago, and the findings point to a conclusion on the part of the court that he was bound for the Haytian coast when he met the "Scouts" on May 26.

Practically every contention made by Admiral Schley in his defence was not accepted by the court. He was sustained only on his claim that the Santiago blockade was effective and that he did not withdraw to a distance of twenty-five miles to sea at night while maintaining it. There had been a general supposition that the court would hold that the "loop" was a proper manœuvre, but the contrary view is expressed in its report. Admiral Schley's first official statement in regard to the oop was made to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. He told the committee that it was the crucial and deciding feature of the combat of July 3 and through it the Brooklyn won the victory in getting out of the way of the fire of her consorts, who were thus enabled to pour a steady fire into the enemy. On the stand he admitted reconcile his two statements remarked that they were only some of his reasons for the turn, and that he could "conjure up" more if necessary. The court accepted the testimony that Schley and Capt. Cook gave the order practically at the same instant, and that fear of coming into dangerous proximity with the enemy's vessels was the reason for it. It declined to recognize Schley's statement to the Senate of his reason for giving the order.

One of the most important features of the court's conclusions is that the Brooklyn in making the turn nearly collided with the Texas, which saved herself by stopping and backing, and that this peculiar manœuvre gave the Spaniards a lead of 1,000 yards over the Brooklyn.

# SCHLEY'S ATTORNEY DISSENTS.

Mr. Bayner Can't See How the Court Could Arrive at Such a Conclusion.

Baltimork, Dec. 13 - Attorney-General Isidor Rayner was seen to-night in reference to the findings of the Schley Court.

"The end is not yet. The American people accept the verdict of Admiral Dewey I do not care to discuss the specifications at length until I have read the opinione in full and have a conference with Admiral Schley I can hardly understand how the majority of the court could arrive at such conclusion in face of the overwhelming evidence given in testimony before the court in favor of Admiral Schiey,

Mr Rayner remarked to conclusion when I see Admiral Betiley negt week will advise him to have the case reopened, either by Congressional investigain any other way."

### THOLOHE HIMSELF OLT OF IT President Clark of the Bigrathic Then

complian Aprillia that Manufelly Waspinston, Line 18 - Major dance Albert Chris. Freshient of the Blancolor branch of the Theorethical Borists of America, has resigned his office and from meruberalists in the nisky. He gives as a himser for matic years and that he has gradinity throught loaself out of again parting with the translations of the account

### ATTIMPT US IMPRESSA TITT Mapart Shat Palace Mar mit After Mitte mer Mar at diattraget:

manufaced from Managhan says that expense of the Engreen Linearies's further an a charity way you old one was instincted that notice mountains of a second marging and I go in how tong the mount remain in Marko Bare to the gardeness & Baffeng of to . The control of the printer of the territor which would remain as ings ware abstraged. This is in believed. the future

# Supplee Coulon would away preferable with

Backers, Start, reference has no gaining for taking that aromatic, having structurement from gamest making and seast. He will be backed in taking anomaly service and anytherine first for the taking a pair in the reporting of the Taymanumer opin. STERRILLANDISCH. CO.

# WEATHER BUREAU SCORCHED.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1901. Rain to-day; snow and much colder to-morrow.

> FIRE JUMPED UP TWENTY STORIES TO GET AT IT.

#### It Blazed Away Merrily in a Pipe Shaft in the American Surety Building While Hundreds Were Hustling About Blithely Unaware of Its Existence.

The American Surety Building at 100 Broadway, which is one of the tallest skyscrapers in town and is sometimes spoken of as the home of trusts, because of the number of corporations it shelters, was afire last evening from subcellar to roof, yet few of its great population knew anything about it. The fire was in a shaft in which run the steam-heating and exhaust pipes, and although the blaze was a merry one while it lasted, it got outside

the shaft only in a few places. One of these places was the office of the United States Weather Bureau, on the twentieth floor, where are stored records and valuable instruments, and there the fire burned away part of a door and incidentally made its presence known for the first time to those in the building. Had it not been for the structure's thorough system of standpipes, put in under the direction of the Fire Department and tested by Chief Croker not long ago, the fire might have turned out to be a very serious one

because of the building's height. The shaft in which the fire burned for nobody knows how long is 6x4 feet and runs from the sub-cellar to the roof. In it are about twelve steam pipes, the main arteries of the building's heating equipment, and also the exhaust pipes for the engines in the basement. The pipes are covered with asbestos jackets, outside which there is a canvas wrapper. According to the police and firemen it was this canvas covering

and firemen it was this canvas covering which caught fire from an overheated pipe in the sub-cellar.

The shaft is at the rear of the building and on the ninth, twelfth, sixteenth and twentieth floors there are openings to it. These are doors going into various offices. It was the weather man at his post on the twentieth floor who discovered the fire a little before 6 o'clock. The opening into the shaft on this floor is in one of the rooms occupied by the Weather Bureau and about that time Francis Long, the clerk rooms occupied by the Weather Bureau and about that time Francis Long, the clerk in charge, stopped a moment from noting wind changes to note a rise in temperature that was taking place in his more imme-

diate vicinity.

He discovered that smoke was pouring from the cracks about the door of the shaft, and he had hardly remarked this before the top of the door burst into flames. Almost touching the door was a bookcase containing the records of New York's blizzards and hot spells for twenty-five years back. In the next room were some instruments of great value, although most of the instruments of the bureau are on the roof. from the cracks about the door of the

the roof.

Mr. Long promptly began to move to a place of safety some of the records. Then he thought he had better tell some one about the fire, so he bolted out into the hall. At the door he met Electrician Walter of the building. There was no elevator anywhere near the top floor then, but the two men, by their yells, induced a local to extend its trip to their floor. In this they made a rapid descent to the ground floor and dashed out into the street.

Policeman Mulvihill had already anticipated them. He had been standing on the opposite side of Broadway and detected a glow on top of the skyscraper. Pretty soon he saw a thin flame shoot up and the next moment he turned in an alarm of fire. About one-fourth of the buildings dailytpopulation had not yet gone home.

that the loop was made to prevent the Brooklyn from getting into torpedo distance of the Spanish vessels, and when asked to of a fire. Some of the typewriters were pretty badly scared then and putting on their wraps got out without taking their

novels along.

Battalion Chief Cruger sent men all

Battalion Chief Cruger sent men all through the building to see where the fire was and hitched two of his biggest engines to the standpipe. When the firemen reached the Weather Bureau they found the flames eating away the door and the room filled with smoke. Opening the door, they saw flames pretty near all the way

down the shaft. On the other floors, where doors opened into the shaft, the firemen found them pretty badly scorched. It was the work of only an instant to unreel the lines of hose in the hallways and turn streams of water down the shaft, and the fire was soon out. The Weather Bureau's office was flooded and some of the records were and the standard of the standa wet, but not so much as to ruin them, the weather man said. Other offices through

which the lines of hose were run were also damaged by water.

As soon as the doors were opened into the shaft the different floors of the building the shall the different moors of the manning began to get emoky, and this increased the alarm of the remaining tenants, with the result that the five elevators began to do a rushing business. Order Cruger had his men tell every one that there was no danger and he reassured a panieky

danger and he roassured a paniety little
crowd on the nineteenth foor that was
waiting for an elevator.

After the fire was out a freman climbed
up the iron laider inside the shaft and discovered that the covering of the piece had estimated the damage at \$2.500

## MRS. BONINE AUGI ITTED. The Jury Finds Her "Not Guitty" of the

Murter of James Seymour Ayres.

WARRINGTON, Dec. 14 -- Mrs. Lola Ida Henry Bonine was to-night acquitted of the interior of James Seymour Ayres. The worder was renched after the jury had deliberated for three hours. When the pury filed in to deliver their worder Mrs Bonne was to all appearances the most interatestized person in the source room: Her remarkable self-possession did not sleared her when after the usual ques-tions, the foreman of the jork announced that the defendant had been adjudged that guilty." The for spectature present

menty bowers and necessary men, the general public having later ascinded, water histo substitutery reprinces; and water Max. Homens hald a notice transporters at the which there shalling breaks with those wine principal about her, and man efferward Mr. Strongtoner, actor classificational faculty classic the roll and the previous obliga-Me. Mirries will stay for the percent with hor descious at he street. Him and

Minimises for frame and fillied. Noticely Acuracy, Mr., Sec. 32. The leading mannon in this feath which will come to analysis family pitterious distribution in the several of his frames for a trip to West mountain of specialist and little to the Main-